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1. INTRODUCTION
The dissertation addresses two topics on market imperfections. Chapter 2
presentsa theoretical model thatfocuses on problems associated with
informational asymmetry between economic agents.Chapter 3 provides an
empirical analysis of problems associated with market power and firm efficiency.
In chapter 2 a dynamic game is developed to analyze problems of
informational asymmetry andsignaling.This game considersstrategic
interactions between a wholesaler and a retailer where demand is uncertain and
only the retailer is privately informed about his/her local demand.This study
shows that informational asymmetries and strategic interactions between retailers
and wholesalers may provide an explanation of the observation that the retail
price is not perfectly adjusted to new demand conditions.To explain this
behavior requires the development of a game structure that is not yet found in the
literature.In our model, the signal-receiver (the wholesaler) moves first by
setting the wholesale price while the signal-sender (retailer) is the first mover in a
typical signaling model.This problem has not been addressed in the signaling
game literature.
In chapter 3 the analysis investigates the relationship between the level of
industry competition and firm efficiency in the Korean cigarette market.The
Korean cigarette market has been monopolized bya government owned company2
until1988 when foreign competition became legal.This produced an
oligopolistically competitive market.This chapter uses a distance function
approach to specify production technology and empirically estimate the impact of
increased competition on firm efficiency in the Korean cigarette industry.This
study is the first study to providean empirical estimate of firm efficiency in the
Korean cigarette market. In addition this study helps to understand the optimizing
behavior of the Korean bureaucratic organization.
These chapters share topicson market imperfection. They both consider
frictional factors of market imperfection, thepresence of informational asymmetry
in one case, and monopolypower and inefficiency in the other.The topics
covered in chapter 2 and 3 are further linked by explaining, when the market is
imperfect, how the market outcome and the behavior of individual economic
agents depart from what the theory of perfect competition suggests. In chapter 2
the presence of informational asymmetry between the retailer and the wholesaler
and the existence of pooling equilibrium explain stickiness of retail price
adjustment and market power in chapter 3 makes firms operatemore inefficiently.
Finally, chapter 4 contains summary and conclusions.3
2. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND TRADE SIGNALING BETWEEN A
MANUFACTURER AND A RETAILER
2.1Introduction
When demand for products is uncertain, retailers might have to set their
retail price and choose how much inventory to hold only basedupon their
expectation of demand which occurs prior to demand arrival.After demand is
realized, however, it is often observed that retail pricesare slow to react to new
demand conditions. In some markets there could be constraintson the ability of
retailers to adjust their prices.For instance, it might take time for demand
information to reach retailersor price information takes time to convey to
customers.Even in markets with few constraints, instantaneous retail prices
adjustment is not a general phenomenon. Recent studies have presented empirical
evidence supporting the significant staggering in price changes (Lach and Tsiddon
(1992, 1996), Tommasi (1993)).
The most common explanation for cross-sectional price dispersion and
staggering in price changes buildson the existence of price adjustment costs
(menu costs) and not perfect correlationamong the demand shocks at different
firms. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983) showan optimal pricing rule (S, s) for
a monopolistically competitive firm.
1Agurregabiria (1999) combines the
Under the (S, s) pricing rule, a nominal price doesnot change if real price moves between an
upper bound, S and a lower bound, s.classical inventorymodel2and pricing models with menucosts3to allow for joint
price and inventory decision with lump-sumordering costs and shows that fixed
ordering costs play avery important role in the dynamics of retail prices.
Theories about resale price maintenance,RPM have also attempted to
address the sluggishness of retail prices.Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1996)
offer one explanation of whya manufacturer would prefer not to have its products
sold by discounters.They show RPM could increase the manufacturer's
wholesale demand and profits under demanduncertainty.
However, these modelsassume theretailersare monopolistically
competitive and price-takers of wholesaleprice.Consequently, they do not
consider possible strategic interactionbetween the wholesaler and the retailer.
Albaek and Overgaad (1991)analyze theverticalrelation between the
manufacturer and a retailer ina signaling game where the manufacturer is
privately informed about the demand.Vincent (1998) considers a signaling game
between a seller and a buyer in generalwhere the buyer is privately informed
about demand and the buyercan possibly a retailer.In none of these signaling
games does the retailer's inventory stock playan important role in the strategic
interaction.Lariviere and Porteus (1995) show that theinventory stock plays a
role through which informationabout demand is acquired. But in mostcases it
appears to be unrealistic to assume thatan individual retailer's inventory stock is
not observable to either wholesaleror consumers.
2
See Scarf (1959) and Blinder (1981).5
In this paper we present a model that considersa strategic interaction
between a monopolist manufacturer anda monopolist retailer where the retailer is
privately informed about his local demand. The monopolist arid the retailer playa
signaling game in this model.In the model presented in this paper, the signal
receiver (manufacturer) is the firstmover who sets the wholesale price for his/her
products while signal sender moves first by sending signals of his private
information in a typical signaling game. Dynamic signalinggames in which the
informed player has a large strategy spaceare typically plagued by a large set of
multiple equilibria. What happens to the set of equilibria ina different structure
of the signaling game where the receiver is the first mover?
The following section presentsa formal model. Section 2.3 discusses the
equilibrium of the model. In section 2.3.1we solve the dynamic game assuming
complete information.The analysis focuses on the role of the unobservable
retailer's inventory stock as a strategic bargainingpower. Section 2.3.2 presents
the equilibrium concept of the signalinggame under incomplete information, and
in section 2.4, we show the existence of both pooling and separating equilibrium
through an example and examine the features of these equilibrium. In Contrastto
the traditional signaling game, in this environment where the signal receiver
moves first, it is shown that the equlibria is a subset of a large set of equilibria that
typical signaling game generates.Finally section 2.5 concludes and discusses
limitations and possible extensions of the model.
See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1983, 1992).2.2 The Model
A manufacturer sells a good toa retailer who in turn sells to consumers.
The retailer is assumed to know demand condition whilethe manufacturer does
not.There are two periods, t= 1, 2 in the game. The manufacturer and the
retailer have a common discount factor 6 In each period,the manufacturer sets a
wholesale price, first and the retailer chooses theamount of the good to purchase
and sets the retail price. Finally,consumers decide how much to purchase given
the retail price. The retailercan have a positive amount of inventory stock if the
retailer purchases more from the manufacturerthan itsells to consumers.
Consumer demand may be highor low. The demand curve takes a simple linear
form D p', where D is the quantity demanded by consumers. p is retail
price in period t, and 9S isa demand parameter where the superscript, S denotes a
state of nature,S = H, L.The manufacturer and the retailer seek to maximize their
total discounted expected profits. The profit ofthe manufacturer is given by
r1q1 +8r2q2,
where iis the wholesale price andq1is the wholesale quantity sold to the retailer
in period t.Superscript A and B denote the manufacturer and the retailer,
respectively. For simplicity,we assume the manufacturer can produce the good at
zero cost. The retailer's profit is
FI'=p1s1 q +6[p2s2 -2q2],7
where s is the retail sales toconsumers in period t.If qj > s, then the retailer's
inventory is x= q Si.The retailer can also choose first period order quantityqi
and retail pricePi such that there is excess demand in the local market. Having
excess demand in one period does not affect demand in the followingperiod.4
Since the game ends in period 2, the optimalP2andqshould not lead to excess
demand or supply in period 2,so that s,O p2and q S2x.
2.3 Equilibrium
2.3.1 Complete Information
To understand the basicgame structure, it is helpful to solve the game by
backward induction assuming completeinformation. In complete information the
retailer always choosepi andqi sothat there is no excess demand in period 1, i.e.,
s1
O
pi. Therefore we have following identities:
Identity 1. qi- x
O
P2
2.q2+x=OS_p2
First, using the identity 2, the retailer'sproblem in period 2 can be written as
Maxp2(05 _p2)_r2(OS-p2x)
An example is a soft drink market wherea consumer will likely substitute another type of drink
rather than demand more of thesame type of drink at a later date if unable to purchase it at
present.8
From the first order conditionswe obtain p as the following.
p7=(O+r2) (1)
Also, using the identity 2,we can solve for q as
q2=(OS_r2)_x (2)
Equation (2) implies that ifr2 is relatively high to the inventory stock such that
(0Sr2)/2x, then the retailer need not order any quantity in the second period.
Second, by substituting forqin equation (2) into the manufacturer's second
period profit, the manufacturer's problemin period 2 is expressed as
The optimal r2 is
Max r7(Ios---r9 x)
{r2 2 2
r, =O x (3)
Note that if x then r2=0. This implies that since r2 cannot be negative,
the retailer has no incentiveto hold his inventory stock more than 0
S12Now
consider the optimizing problems inperiod 1. Both agents are to maximize total
discounted expected profits.First, the retailer's problem assumingr20, q70
in period 1 is9
Maxpi(O-pi)ri(0-p1 +x)+&fi2(0-p2)r2(O-p2x)]
From the first order conditions it is straightforwardto obtain the following
solutions.
pl
x=l5 27
2 38
(4)
ifr1 <308/4
ifr1308/4 (5)
Note that if r1308/4,x=0 and so, r2 in equation (3) becomesr2=Os. The
optimal q is calculated by using identity 1 and equation (4)and (5) as
ifr1<308/4
2 38
='O---r1 ifr1306/4 (6)
2 2
For future reference,we can also express r2 as a function ofpi andqi.
= (p1 + q1) if r1 <308/4
= if r308/4(sincepi + q
0S)(7)
Second, using equation (2) and (7),we can rewrite the manufacturer's problem as
a function of r1 as10
Max r1(0S
+ 23898
The optimal r1 is obtained from first ordercondition as
98
)0 (8) 98+8
For positive inventoryx, it must be satisfied that r <380S14as in equation (5). If
8> 4/9, ther1in equation (8) is less than 380 S14Therefore, if 8> 4/9, the
optimal inventory stockispositive given the manufacturer's optimalri.
Therefore, it can be concluded that theretailer chooses an order that yields a
positive amount of inventory stock fora reasonable range of discount rates. The
retailer does this fora strategic reason to increase his bargaining power and lower
the second period wholesale price. Thisresult occurs even though the magnitude
of local demand is commonly known.
2.3.2 Incomplete Information
Now, suppose that only the retailer knowslocal consumer demand. We
assume the manufacturer observes only the retail price andorder quantity sold to
the manufacturer in each periodbut not the retailer's inventory amount. The
manufacturer-retailer interaction becomesa signaling game where the retailer
strategically uses his private informationwith choosing pi andqi as signals of
demand.In this game, two types of equilibriumare analyzed: pooling and
separating equilibrium.11
2.3.2.1 Pooling equilibrium
In a typical signalinggame the privately informed player sends a signal
first.Differently, in our model the uninformedagent, the manufacturer moves
first setting the wholesale price inthe first period,Obviously, the first period
choice of the manufacturer's wholesaleprice should be the one maximizing his
total profit over two periods.However, how to setiappears to be a difficult
problem. Therefore,now, let us consider a sub game which consists of steps after
initial wholesale price,ris determined. We examine two types of equilibrum,
pooling and separating, given the firstperiod wholesale price,r1.
In pooling equilibrium, the retailerwants to hide information about
consumer demand by choosing the same combination of(pi",qi") regardless of
whether demand is highor low.The superscript p denotes pooling strategy.
Pooling equilibrium fail to exist if beliefsfor non-pooling p andq are high type.
To describe a pooling equilibrium, first,we need to specify the manufacturer's
belief, u(I]1p1, qi), where 1u(I11Pi,qi) is the probability of the high type when he
observespiandqi.The off-path equilibrium of the manufactureris that the
probability of the high type p(H
IPi, qi)=I for any observable (pi, qi)
qP). Simply,if the manufacturer's belief is
(i)(II]pi,qi) 1 for(pi,qi)(pi",qi")
= for (pr, qi)(p1P, c11P),
where superscript denotes poolingstrategy. Then the manufacturer's strategy is12
(ii)r2(pi, qi)=r2H for(p1,qi)(p1P, q1P)
=r2° for(p1, q1)(pIP, q1P)
In a pooling equilibrium the manufacturercannot update his prior belief
after observing (p1", q1P) since heinitially believes that the retailer will choose
(p1P,qi") no matter whether demand is highor low.Thereby, he sets
corresponding wholesale price, r/ which maximizesthe manufacturer's second
period expected profit, Efl2A(r2).However, even if r2" is argmax of E1114(r2 P),
the manufacturer might wantto charge not the wholesale price r2" but r211 to the
retailer in the second period.This occurs when the profit from charging r2H is
greater than charging r2p5In this case the second period wholesale price will
always be r2" regardless of the retailer'stype and the each type of retailer will
choose its optimal(pi,qi) corresponding to the r2H, respaectively.Therefore,
there is no incentive for the retailerto hide information by choosing (pt", qP).
Consequently, in this case,a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. For the purpose of
analyzing pooling equilibrium, therest of discussion in this paper will concentrate
only the case where the manufacturercharges r21' in the second period. Therefore
the following additional conditionmust be satisfied.
EH (r2)=T2" (2q' (r2)+(1)t)q (r2)) EH (r2')=r2H (,2,H (r")+(12)q (r2'))
First, if r2is such that (0 L..r2P)/2 <x', the lowtype retailer's second period order quantity fromt q2Lis zero and only the high type's orderquantity q!' is positive. In this case, because the
manufacturer only profits when S=H, charging r2'rather than r2°is more profitable: the
manufacturer's expected profit in period 2 EH(r2H)=r211Aq211 > Efl(r2")r2'Aq211. Second, even
if q2' is positive givenr2the manufacturer might still charge r,', when manufacturer's expected
second period profit by charging r211 isgreater than that by charging r2: EH(r21)= >
ErJ2A(rzP)=r2°[Aq2" +(I-2) q2H]13
where EJJ2'1(r2") and EITE2'1(r21')are the manufacturer's second period profit by
charging r2 and r211 respectively.
When the manufacturer charges r21' given qP), the profit of the retailer
in equilibrium is
fl(p,q1
Ir2)=pq°r1q +8[p7(OSp2)r21'q2
Note that unlike the complete informationcase, the first period sales quantity si is
not necessarily greater or equal to pi but might be less thanOpr". That
is, it is possible to haveexcess demand. In summary, conditions for a pooling
equilibrium to exist are
Condition1.i.r E argmax U'1
u. r/ e argmax
iii. EJJ (r2")EfJ2' (r2hhi)
iv. (pEP, qP) e argmax
iv.i U'3(pi", q/ 0H,
Ti)flB(1,qij rj', O, ri)
iv.ii U'1(p/', qP ri', 0L, ri)flB(1qil rj,9L,Ti)
The conditions, iv.i and iv.ii, implythat for both types of demand, the retailer
should not have any incentiveto deviate from the equilibrium. In other words, the
profit of the retailer in poolingequilibrium should be greater or equal to the
maximum profit when deviating from(pi", qP).The wholesale price in the
second period rz" can be writtenas a function of (pi", q) and this may take14
different functional form dependingon the manufacturer's prior belief about (pi°,
q1P)6Given an initial first period wholesale pricer1, if the wholesale price in the
second period r21' is substituted into the profit function ofthe retailer, it can be
also expressed as a function of(pI°,
q1P)and r1. Figure 2.1 provides the retailer's
profit function and pooling equilibrium condition,iv.i and iv.ii. In Figure 2.1(a)
and (b) the ri E [ri"0, ri"1] satisfies the conditioniv.i and the ri E [riLO, ri's]
satisfies the condition iv.ii.In Figure 1 (a), within the range ofri E [ri"0,rim],
the retailer's second period profitcurve,flB(1Pq1P r2", 9Hri), lies above the
curve,
flB(p1,
qil 0Hri). Similarly, in Figure 1 (b), the curve,flB(1P q1P
rj,0L
ri), lies abovethe curve,[TB(1,
iIr/',OL,r1), for the range, ri E
ri'].Thus, the ranger1of that satisfies both conditions,iv.i and iv.iiis the
intersection of [ri"0, ri'1'] and [r1', riL]. Providedthat r10 < nH0 <ritA <ri"1,
the range of for pooling equilibriumis [ri"0, riA].For r1out of this range,
pooling equilibrium is not possible andthe only possible equilibrium is
separating. Even if there existsa range of rl that satisfies both conditions,iv.iand
iv.ii, the pooling equilibriummay not be sustainable.This occurs when the
manufacturer's maximum expected profit from chargingr out of the range,[ri'10,
ri''] is greater than themaximum expected profit in pooling equilibrium given the
range ofr1 E [ri"0, ri'1].
This is because variables such as optimal solutions,x,r2,P2, and q2 are not differentiable in some
parameter regimes. For example, the functionr23O/2 + qf is kinked atp1° +
becauser2= (pt' +q1P) jfpP+ qf &sbut 0 otherwise.Figure 2.1 The Range of the First PeriodWholesale Price
For Pooling Equilibrium
fl'3(pi, qi(r1,0L)
qP
r1,0H)
110 HI
r1 p1
(a) High Type
o
LO LI
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0L)
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2.3.2.2Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, the retailer revealshis type. To describe the
separating equilibrium the manufacturer's beliefneeds to be specified. One belief
that fulfills conditions for separating equilibriumis
(i),u(LIp1,q1)= 1
The manufacturer's strategy is
(ii)r2(p, qi) =r2L
H
r2
Then the retailer's bestresponse must be
-L L for(pi,qi)(pi ,qi)
otherwise
-L L for(pi,qi)=tpi,qi)
otherwise
-L L H-HII (iii)(p1,q1r2L)=(p1,qi )and(pI,qllr2)=(pi,qi )
In summary the conditions fora separating equilibrium are
Condition 2. L r4argmax LI1'
ii. r2Earginax
iii.(pS, q1S1rj,8c)
EargmaxLIB(r2Sf)
JJB(p1L, q1L1r21, 0", ri)11B1H, q1Hri', 0L ri)
fjB(pH, q1H1rj', 0H ri)fJB(p1L q1Lr2,0H,ri)
Generally, bad type (high demandtype in our model) has an incentive to mimic
the other type. The conditioniii.i and iii.ii implies that for both types of demand,17
the retailer should not haveany incentive to mimic the other type in the
equilibrium. In other words, the profit of the retailer from revealinghis type in a
separating equilibrium should be greateror equal to the maximum profit from
mimicking the other type. The retailer's profit from revealingis
The retailer's profit from mimicking is
where ST. Any pair of(pi, qi)that satisfies the above conditions, iii, iii.i, and
iii.ii can be possibly a separating equilibrium.Therefore there exists an area of
equilibrium pair of (pi, q) ina (pi, qi) space. A particular pair of(pi,qi) as an
equilibrium depends on the monopolist's priorbelief about the separating
equilibrium.Similar to pooling equilibrium, the profits from mimicking and
revealing are finally functions of the initialr. We should notice that if the profit
from revealing is greater than frommimicking, there is no incentive for the
retailer to mimic the other type. In thisno envy7 case each type of retailer will
fully reveal his type, andso, the equilibrium is identical to the complete
information case. As depicted in Figure2.2,since the high type retailer's profit
from mimicking lies above the profit fromrevealing for the range of ri E [r10, r12],
it is envy case. It isno envy case in the range ofri E [ri2, r13]
in no-envy case, the high type retailercan achieve the highest payoff because his best response
tor21yields higher profit than tor,Hsuch that11B1ffq1H r,"J")>flB(p1L q1L1 r2L1)18
Figure 2.2 The Range of the First Period Wholesale Price
For Separating Equilibrium
H H*H*H
1,i 1r2'61')
HB(pl*, r2L0W)
0 r10 r11 r12 r13 r1
where (pi,
qjS)is the complete information solution (fully revealing),
SH,L.19
2.3.2.3 The Intuitive Criterion
We are interested in whether pooling equilibrium survives under the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987).8 Consider the following conditions.
Condition 3. i. 11113(Jf° qi'i r))> HB(PI, qj r21)
ii. flu(Pf° q1P r21') < fiB (pi, qij rL)
Define(p1', qi')to be an area of (pi, qi) that satisfies the condition i and iiifl p1
andqspace. Suppose there exists (pi',qi').Then, choices of (pi,qi)such that
(p1, qi)(pt', qi')are equilibrium-dominated for the retailer facing high type
demand, because even the lowest wholesale price in the secondperiod yields
lower profit to the retailer than the profit under pooling equilibrium.However,
these choices are not equilibrium-dominated for the low-demandtype retailer. If
such a choice convinces the manufacturer that theconsumer demand is low, then
the manufacturer will offer low wholesale price in the secondperiod, which will
make the low-demand type retailer better off than pooling equilibrium.Thus,
since the low type retailer hasan incentive to deviate from pooling equilibrium,
the Cho- Kreps intuitive criterion is not satisfied in this case.
8If the information set followinga message m is off the equilibrium path and equilibrium
dominated for the type S. then the receiver's beliefp (SI in1)should place zero probability on S.
See Cho and Kreps (1987).20
2.4 Example
It can be shown that a pooling anda separating equilibrium exist by
considering a simple example. Suppose that 0"= 1,9L= 1/2, 20.1 and 8= 1.
2.4.1 Pooling Equilibrium
Suppose that the manufacturer's initial belief qP)=(0.445, 0.105).
The manufacturer knows each type of retailer's inventory amount. Since pi'+ q"
0.55>0L= 0.5, the low type retailer's inventory x' is positive: = qi (0L..
p1").The low type's second period order quantity isq' - x'.Ifwe
substitutep2'S
(0L+ r2")/2 andxL =
qi
(9Lpi") into we can calculateq'
as
q =O' '2 -(p" +q[)
However, the manufacturer expects the high type retailer hassome sales in period
1 but no inventory stock sinceqi"+= 0.55 < 0= 1.Therefore, the order
quantityofthe high type retailer in period 2 isq-/' P2.Using
2H(OH
r2")/2 we obtain
(9Hr2")/2
The manufacturer's expected second period profitrf [2(q211) +(12)(q )]is then21
EHr2P[2(9 +q))},
From the first order condition, the optimalr21'is
= + (1 (p +qf))
From above formula wecan obtain rf,P211,
2L q2Handin this example as
followings.
r2" = 0.1(1/2) + 0.9(0.75 0.55)0.23
p2(r{)
0H12+ r2172 = (1 + 0.23)/2 = 0.615
q2=(1- 0.23)/2 = 0.385
= (1/2 + 0.23)/2 = 0.365
q2= 3/2(0.23)/20.55 = 0.085
The condition 1. ii is satisfiedso that the manufacturer charges r2° as discussed in
previous section (see Appendix B.1).
2.4.2.1Profits of the Retailer
Now, let's consider the retailer's profit from poolingstrategy and the
maximum profit from deviation.
Profit of the high type
Pooling:fl'"(pf,q" OHrP)= 0.194950.105r (see Appendix B.2.a)22
If the retailer deviates from poolingstrategy, then he faces r211. So, the maximum
profit is identical to the profit fully revealing histype under complete infonnation
(see Appendix A).
Deviation: H''(p[',q['
IO',r,")72/12 ij +1/2if r <0.75
=5/16r1/2+r12/4 if 0.75r1<l
(see Appendix B.2.b)
Profit of the low type
Poo1ing:flBH(p,qO',r,)=0.05420.105r1(see Appendix B.2.b)
Deviation:flBH(p[,q[ IGL,r2H)= 1/2(1/4 -r12)-ri(112-r1)ifr1 <
=0 ifr1O'
(see Appendix B.2.c)
The range of r1 that satisfies condition 1. iv.i, 1. iv.ii, 2.iii.i, and 2. iii.ii is
(1) 0.51109r10.5162(see Appendix B.3)
If the manufacturer sets the wholesale price in the firstperiod ri within the range
in (1), then pooling equilibrium exists sinceqi, r2',
p2Sand
q2Sare mutual
best responses to each other given the manufacturer's priorbelief (pj, q1P)=
(0.445, 0.105). For r1 out of thisrange, pooling equilibrium cannot be possible
and if there exists an equilibrium, the only possible equilibriumis separating23
Now consider the manufacturer's expected profit in pooling equilibrium
(see Appendix B.4) and the manufacturer's expected profit in separating
equilibrium for each range of r1. For each differentrange of ri, possible sets of
separating equilibrium are analyzed in Appendix C.Also, the manufacturer's
expected profits are calculated in Appendix D. For the time being, ifwe present
the result of analysis, the Profits in both pooling and separating equilibriumare
Pooling :Max ITT
A(i, q1°)=r1q+r2° [2q'+(12)qI
=0.08065 (when r1=0.5162)
Separating:Max LIA (ri,rp,q)=0.08007, if r0.375
=0.07344, if 0.375 <r10.5
=0.05438, if 0.5ri0.75
=0.05, if r0.75
If the manufacturer has prior belief (p°,q4O)=(0.445, 0.105) and accordingly
charges ri within the range, 0.51109r10.5162, then a pooling equilibrium is
possible. The manufacturer's maximum expected profit in pooling equilibrium is
0.08065. Out of the range, the manufacturer knows pooling equilibrium doesnot
exist, so, the only possible equilibrium is separating. Whenr1 is out of range
0.51109 r10.5162, the maximum expected profit of the manufacturer in
separating equilibrium is 0.08007.Therefore, given the manufacturer's prior
belief charging r=0.5162 is more profitable to the manufacturer anda pooling
equilibrium exists in this example.24
2.4.2.2 The Intuitive Criterion
To examine the intuitive criterionwe need to consider the second period
wholesale price for the low type, We can express r2' withp and q instead of
inventory stock x. In this circumstance because themanufacturer believes that the
retailer is the low type, r2" would be followings.
r2L= 19L Ifpi+qi<OL
r2L= OL_(P1 +q1) 1f0L<P +q
From the manufacturer's perspective, the optimalp1 +q1 is greater than 0'i
However, ifp1+ q >30
L12it means x> O'I2, and then this will obviously tell
the manufacturer that the retailer isnot the low type because the low type retailer
will never have x > 0L12 Therefore, therestriction for solutions isp1 + q30
L12Now, let's consider the minimum ofHBp1,iIr2').If qi=0, then the
second period wholesale price r21 takes the highestvalue, 30L12Consequently,
p2H(r2L)is(OH +9L)(1 + 0.25)/2=0.625and q(r21)-2H (r,L
)0.375.
This will lead the zero profit in period 1 andthe minimum second period profit to
the retailer. Thus, the minimized profit ofthe retailer is
Mm {flB'(p1, qil r21)}[(P2H(r2L)-r21)(
HpH(r2L))]
=[(0.625 0.25)(0.375)]=0.14602525
HP p p SupposeFIB(Piqi Ir) < mm{I1BH(Pl,iI r21)}.Then we can say that there is
not any combination of(pi, qi)that satisfies the condition 3. i. Even if thereare
some combinations of(pi,q)that satisfy the condition 3. ii, it is guaranteed that
there is no(p, qi)that satisfies the condition 3. iand 3. ii simultaneously.
Therefore, this is a sufficient condition forsatisfying the intuitive criterion. To
satisfy the condition the followingmust be true.
I1B(pl, q1Pr2) = 0.194950.l05r1<mm{[TB"(pl, qilr')} 0.146025
The range ofri that satisfies the above inequality is
(2) r > 0.46595
Conclusively, if ris in this range, the pooling equilibrium satisfies theintuitive
criterion.Since the range ifri for existence of pooling equilibrium in section
2.4.1 is in the aboverange (2), it can be concluded that, in this example, the
pooling equilibrium also survives the ChoKreps intuitive criterion.
2.4.2 Separating Equilibrium
Suppose the manufacture believesthe retailer will employ a separating
strategy.Depending on different regimes of initialr1, the possible separating
equilibrium are (see Appedix C):26
(1)If ri>380"/4:
No envy case: separating equilibrium is that eachtype chooses the complete
information solution fully revealing histype.
(2) If OL<r<36H/4
If 0.5 127 r10.75it is envy case (there is an incentive for mimicking).
However, there is no way to make the hightype not to mimic the low type even
though the high type retailer hasan incentive to mimic the low type. So, the high
always mimic the low type and there is onlyan unique pooling equilibrium with
(pin, qi)(1L q1L)
Therefore, there is no separating equilibrium in thiscase. If
0.5r<0.5 127, then in separating equilibrium the eachtype reveals it's type by
choosing the solution under complete information.
(3) If3O'/4r1< 0L
Separating equilibrium is that eachtype chooses the complete information
solution fully revealing his type.
(4) Ifri<30L/4:
It is no envy case and separating equilibriumis identical to the solution under
complete information.As we saw in previous section, the manufacturer will
obtain the maximum expected profit0.08007 by charging r=0.29118 (see
Appendix D). Given the manufacturer's firstperiod wholesale price r1=0.29118,
the retailer's optimal choicesare:
I.(9L+rj)12 =0.3955927
H -(OH+ ri)/2 = 0.64559
q'6- 7r1/6 = 0.16029
q1H=9H7r116 = 0.66029
Thus, equilibrium is definedas
(ri,pi'pi", qi1,
qiH)(0.29118, 0.39559, 0.64559, 0.16029, 0.66029)
Therefore, in this example,we showed that there exit both pooling and separating
equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusions
This paper presents a model that considers strategic interactionsbetween a
monopolist manufacturer anda retailer in a dynamic signaling game when the
retailer's inventory stock can playa role in bargaining power.
First, in the game assuming complete information, the retailer choosesa
wholesale order quantity that yieldsa positive amount of inventory stock in
equilibrium.Unlike the classical inventory models, thereason for a positive
amount of inventory is not because of demand uncertainty but because of the
strategic reason to increase his/her bargainingpower in second period.
Second, in the signalinggame under incomplete information it is shown
that both pooling and separating equilibriumexist. We also show existence of a
pooling equilibrium that survives the ChoKreps intuitive criterion. In addition,28
it is found that a dynamic signalinggame, where the signal receiver is the first
mover, can eliminate a subset of a large set of equilibria thata general signaling
game typically produces.
Finally, it is possible that ina pooling equilibrium a change in retail price
over periods is smaller than that of an equilibrium under complete information.
Therefore, without menu costsor ordering costs, staggering in price is partially
explained by a strategic interaction betweenwholesalers and retailers under
asymmetric information.
In this study we focuson a game between a monopolist wholesaler and a
monopolist retailer.Future study may explore a signalinggame in an
oligopolistic market where retailers and wholesalershave oligopoly powers.
Possible extensions may includea multiple periods or infinite horizon signaling
game.29
3. COMPETITION ANDEFFICIENCY IN THE KOREAN CIGARETTE
MARKIET: A DISTANCE FUNCTIONAPPROACH
3.1 Introduction
For many years, the Korean governmentalcorporation had a monopoly in.
the sale of cigarettes in Korea.In 1948 a government agency, the Monopoly
Bureau of Ministry of Financewas established as the sole distributor of cigarettes
and red ginseng. Regarding the cigarettebusiness, it had monopsony power in the
tobacco leaf market and, at thesame time, monopoly power in the sale of
cigarettes.In April 1952 the Monopoly Bureau reorganizedinto the Office of
Monopoly. In 1987 it was transformedinto a government-invested institution. In
1997 its legal statuswas changed to a joint-stock company. Now the Korean
cigarette company (Korea Tobacco andGinseng Corporation) plans to privatize
the corporation by theyear 2000.
The most remarkable change in the Koreancigarette market, however, was
that the domestic marketwas opened for foreign companies in 1987 and it was
completed in 1988. With this change, themarket structure of the Korean cigarette
industry is likely to have becomemore competitive.
Before 1987, the mainsources of X-inefficiency' were, first, lack of
competition and second, bureaucracy.The level of competition in the Korean
cigarette market has increased since1988 due to market liberalization.It is30
argued that competition is expectedto make firms more efficient than they would
be under less competition (Leibenstein1969, Clarkson 1972).There is some
evidence that being forced tocompete reduces costs and raises efficiency. For
example, Crandall (1989) and Shin andYing (1993) found that increased
competition resulted in significant productivitygains for firms in the U.S.
telephone industry.On the other hand, it is also agreed that the impact of
competition on the efficiency of the industryis not always positive but depends
on many factors including the characteristics of the industry.Grosskopf Ct al.
(1993) conclude that the banksoperating under competition became more
efficient after the major market concentrationby consolidation and mergers in the
U.S. banking industry in 1991.Wilson and Jadlow (1982) obtained empirical
findings that support the hypothesis that,hospitals with less competition are more
efficient. Now, given structural changeof the market in Korean cigarette industry
in 1988, one might question whetherthere has been an improvement in the level
of efficiency of the Korean cigarettefirm due to increased competition.
Bureaucracy still remains because the Korean cigarettecompany has not
privatized yet. An organization suchas a non-profit organization or a government
enterprise may suffer from inefficientallocation of resources.Since the
objectives of managers in thoseorganizations may involve their utilities as wellas
the profits, their behaviormay not be consistent with simple cost minimization.
The existence of X-efficiency impliesthat firms do not always introduce technical changes when
available and profitable (Leibenstein, H.,1969).31
Niskanen (1971) first developeda theory of the supply of public goods in a
bureaucracy which predicts that production will exceed the sociallyoptimal size.
Mique and Belanger (11974) have extended the Niskanen modelby proposing that
managers prefer large staffs. Williamson (1964) offers a similar model wherea
utility maximizing director will operatea firm to his own interests by acquiring
larger staffs. De Alessi (1969)proposes a model where public utility managers
will exhibit a bias toward capital-intensive budget. Thuscompetition-efficiency
relationship and bureaucratic inefficiencyare empirical issues that cannot be
assumed but need to be testedon a case-by-case basis.
In this study, we investigate whetheror not the introduction of
competition by trade exposure has increased the technical and/or allocative
efficiency of the Korean cigarettecompany.In order to analyze efficiency
change, we first followa distance function approach to model production
technology.The distance function is appropriate to describe multi-output
technology since outputs include twotypes of cigarettes, filter and non-filter type.
Second, we apply the duality from Shephard'slemma to derive shadow prices of
inputs and specify input price equations.A behavioral cost is explicitly included
in the input priceequations.2The behavioral cost is obtained from using shadow
input prices in the cost equation instead ofactual input prices. A system of
equations is, then, constructed with the distancefunction and input price
equations.The system is jointly estimated using annual dataon the Korean
cigarette market from 1965 to 1996. Thenwe compare the ratio of shadow prices
2
This 'behavioral cost' is analogous to the 'shadowcost' in Atkinson and Harvorsen (1986).32
to the ratio of observed prices to obtain theKorean firm's allocative efficiency for
each observation.Third, given observed residuals,we calculate the expected
value of non-negative error thatrepresents technical inefficiency by decomposing
the error term into two randomvariables in the manner of stochastic frontier
estimation. Finally, weuse a bootstrapping technology to test hypotheses about
competition and efficiency in Korean cigarettemarket. The paper is organized as
follows. In section 3.2an inefficiency model with input allocation is introduced.
In section 3.3 the theory of distancefunction and duality is briefly reviewed.
Section 3.4 contains the stochastic modelspecification and data description. In
section 3.5 empirical resultsare discussed. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 The Inefficiency Model with Input Allocation
The standard competitive inputallocation for a firm's cost minimization
problem is that marginal rates of technicalsubstitution equal factor price ratios.
In reality, however, this isnot necessarily true for various reasons. Literatureon
the effects of rate of returnregulation on efficiency tells us that relative price
efficiency (marginal rates of technicalsubstitutions equated to factor price ratios)
does not exist in the regulated industry.When input choices are not flexible due
to a long-term contract,or complete information about input prices is not
available, firms may also suffer from inputmisallocation. As seen in the previous
section, bureaucracycan be a source of this type of inefficiency. If a non-optimal33
input allocation occurs, this impliesa firm chooses input in such a manner as to
minimize not the actual cost but theshadowcost.3
For an example, let's considera bureaucratic organization model.It is
assumed that bureaucrats maximizea utility which is a function of output and
inputs of a productionprocess.Grosskopf and Hayes (1993) formalize the
general problem as:
where
and
max A = u(y, x) + w,x() + 8(1D(y, x)),
y(Yi,...,Ym), is the vector of outputs;
x = (xi,...,x), is the vector of inputs;
w = (wi,... ,we),is the vector of input prices;
k = revenueor budget, assumed to be fixed;
D(y, x)= multi-output technology"
The first-order conditions yield theallocation of inputs which maximizes the
utility:
8D(y,x)/ax,w,(iU(y,x)/ôx1)/p
(1)
aD(y, x)/ax w1(aU(y, x)/ x)/1u
Also see Atkinson and 1-larvorsen (1986).
' D(.)is the input distance function,a multiple output representation of technology, allowing for
joint production. D(.) is discussedin more detail in Section 3.3.34
Equation (1) can be rewrittenas
aD(y,x)/x,w;"
(2) -i-Wi'
wherewSis the ith shadow input price.If w5'/wJ is less than w/w1, the relative
shadow price of x, is lower thanthe actual price ratio and this implies the
bureaucrat overutilizes that input relativeto observed input price.This is
illustrated in Figure 3.1, where inputx is relatively overutilized.
xi
w
WI
Figure 3.1 Input Choice Bundle andAllocative Efficiency
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The observed relative price of the inputbundleis given by the absolute value
of the slope of the lineww. The re'ative shadow prices for the input vectoris
given by the absolute value of the slope of thelinewSwS.Note that the isoquant
is tangent to the linew 'w' at x', illustrating the fact that cost is not minimized at
with ww. Allocative inefficiency is capturedby the deviation betweenwS/wjS
and w/w,.
3.3 The Distance Function and Duality
3.3.1 The Distance Function
The input distance function isa mapping from the set of input vectors, x
x = {xj,x2, ...,x} and output vectors,yEfl+m,
y = {Yi, Y2, ..,Ym} into the
real line. Formally this function,Dj(y,x) is defined as
where
Dj(y,x)max{O (x/O)L(y)}, (3)
L(y){xxcanproducey} (4)
The input distance function seeks themaximum possible radial contraction of the
observed input bundlex which allows production of the observed output bundle y.
Figure 3.1 helps to understand thedistance function. Observation K employs the
input bundle (xt, xJ') to produceoutput level / (which may be a vector). In this
example, the value of the distance functionfor observationK is OK/OKSince36
the technical efficiency for this observationis OK'/OK, i.e. Farrell technical
efficiency is the reciprocal of the distance function.Thus, technical efficiency is
1/D1(yK, x')=OK'/OK. Dj(y, x)=1 if and only if the input bundle is an element
of the isoquant of L(y), and forany x and y such that x e L(y), D1(y, x)1. The
input distance function providesa complete description of technology with
minimal structure.The distance function satisfies fairly general regularity
properties (see Fare and Grosskopf, 1990).It is homogeneous of degree one in
inputs, concave in inputs,convex in outputs, non-decreasing in inputs and non-
increasing in outputs. The distance functioncan easily model a multiple output
technology and has the advantage of being dualto the cost function which we use
to identif' allocative efficiency.
Figure 3.2 Input Distance Function:D(yKdo)=OK/OK'
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3.3.2 Duality: Not Allowing Inefficiency
Allocative efficiency implies that shadowprices equal observed prices.
Shephard (1953) showed that thecost function and the distance function are dual
to each other. The duality between thecost and distance function can be stated as
follows.
C(y, w)=mini {wx : D1 (y, x)1} (5)
D1 (y, x)=min {wx C(y, w)l}, (6)
where w is the (1 x n) vector of inputprices. From the above duality between the
cost and the distance function, Fare andPrimont (1995) show that the solution
vector for cost minimization satisfies thefollowing.
w=C(y,w)VD1(y,x),
where w istheinput price vector andVD (y, x)=
ôDXy,x)/ôx],We interpret x as the cost minimizing solutiongiven (w,y).
3.3.3 Duality: Allowing AllocativeInefficiency
(7)
Assuming shadow cost minimization,we can employ a shadow cost
function corresponding to the actualcost function in (7) as
ws =C(y,ws)VDj(y,x), (8)38
wherewSis the shadow price vector forx. Here,wSis the price that supports the
actual input vector x, wherewS [wiS,w} = ...,Øw]. The ç
parameters, i = 1,... , n measure divergence of actual from shadow prices for the
firm. The dual relationship of the distancefunction to the cost function allows us
to apply Shephard's lemma to obtain the (cost deflated) shadowprices. The first
derivatives of the input distance function withrespect to input quantities yield
(cost deflated) shadow prices of those inputs(see Blackorby and Russell (1989)).
Therefore, the first derivative of input i correspondingto (6) is
w_Y).c(yWs) (9)
From equation (7), the relative shadow prices ofthe input i andj is expressed as
w;'aD1(y,x)Iox,
w aD1(y,x)Iax1
(10)
We can calculate allocative efficiencyìç that is the ratio0, / 0,as the following.
- ,w/ w D,(.)/D,(.)
(11)
w / w1 w/w1
whereD, (.) = D1 (y, x) / ax,.If, =1 for all 1,], then the observation is said to
be allocatively efficient.IfKu> 1, factor i is underutilized relative toIat
observed relative prices, and ifi< 1, factor i is overutilized.
This shadow price ratio is closely relatedto the nonminmal cost literature. See for example
Toda(1976) or Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986).39
3.4 Stochastic Specification
In this analysis we estimatea generalized translog form of the input
distance function.
In[D1(y,x)p1]= fl0 +/3,lny+(i/2)/3k,1YkYi+ akJlflyklflXJ
k k I kj
+(1/2)y11lnx,lnx1+y.lnx1+fl,1t+/J2tD +/33D +e,, (12)
where x. is the input quantity andYkis the output, i1,..., nand k1,..., m.
Note that1rni. We add a time trend, t to capture technological change over
periods.The pattern of the annual dataon tobacco leaves, which is the most
important raw material in the production of cigarettes,indicates that there might
be a structural change in the productiontechnology in 1977.6 Figure 3.3 shows
thatthequantity of tobaccoleavesdecreased dramaticallyafter1977.
To account for this, a dummy variable is included.Define D = 1 if before 1977
and zero otherwise. The interactionterm of the time-dummy variable is added
because the effect of the time trendon technological change in the period before
1977 may differ from the effect of time inthe period after 1977.
6
While the increase rate of the cigarette consumptionhas fallen due to the anti-smoking movements
all over the world in 1 970s, that of theKorean cigarette consumption did not fall in I 970s. Except
slight decrease between 1982 and 1986, theoverall increase rate in the 1980s did not fall, either. In
Korea, according to an industry expert, however,the cigarette company's demand for tobacco
leaves fell dramatically after 1977primarily due to an improvement of raw material-saving
production technology. SeeReport on the Korean monopoly Business, 4:p ii.Figure 3.3 Quantity of Tobacco Leaves.
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It is possible to determine D(y, x) from productiondata. However, it is
not easy to directly determine C(y, w) in equation(8) since it is a function of the
shadow price vector thatwe are trying to compute. Let's denote this cost C(y,ws)
as a function of the shadow price vector to be the behavioralcost,CB,where
CB= q5,w1x,. Then equation (9) becomes
w
t3D,(x,y).CBöD(x,y)0
(13)
xi
Note thatCBis the cost function such that themanager's input choices may be
inefficient. Dividing both sides with theactual cost,c'=w1x,, and recalling
that w = Ø1w1, the above equationbecomes the following.41
ø1w ica8D(x,
ø1.w1x1)1Ca (14)
Now, if we denote S,= w/C as the observed cost-deflated input price of input i,
(i = 1,m,k) and also denoteP2andp3as çb2/çbi and Ø/q5j, respectively, then we can
write cost-deflated input priceequations for three different inputs (labor,raw
materials and capital) from equation(14) as follows.
söDj(x,y)(wIl+p2wmm+p3wkk)
(15)
/
ai Ca
aD1(x,y) (w111p2+ wmm + (p31 p2)wkk)
(16) Sm
am
ôD1(x,y)((w11)/p3 +(p2 1p3)wmm+wkk) =
(17) Sk
ca
Equations (12) and (15) through(17) constitute a system of nonlinear equations.
We estimate them ina NLS (Non-linear Least Square) system of equations using
the SUR estimation technique.D-W test revealed first-order autocorrelation in
the distance function equation.The Hildreth-Lu procedurewas used to obtain an
efficientestimator.7Input and output quantitiesare treated as exogenous
We replaced the distance functionequation in (10) in the system of equations with the following
equation.
y1-py= (xpr1)fl+u,,
where y is (n x 1) dependent variablevector,x1is (n x k) matrix of explanatory variable,/3 is (k x 1) vector of coefficient estimates,n is number of observation and k is number of number of
explanatory variable. The widely usedtechniques for finding estimates ofp was advocated by
Hildreth and Lu (1960). See Davidsonand Mackinnon (1993) for detail.42
variables since the distance function has the advantage for our purpose of being
'agnostic'.8The difference between this approach and previous studies is that, in
this analysis the shadow price ratios,p2and p are included as parameters that are
estimated in the system ofequations.9In fact, in the previous studies, the system
of equations are estimated with the restrictionp2 = p3= 1. However, it might be
expected that estimatingp2and3as a parameter in the system of equations is
helpful to obtain more precise coefficient estimates for the distance function in
equation (12).Finally, from the derivative of the estimated distance function,Kjj
for each observation can be computed by using equation (8).
3.5 Data and Empirical Results
We used annual data for the years 1965-1996 from the Korean cigarette
market. Data sources and descriptive statistics are listed in Table 1. The output
was categorized into two types, filter and non-filter cigarettes (QF and QNF).
The inputs are labor (L), raw materials/tobacco leaves (M), and capital (K).
Using labor expenditure, raw materials cost, and the input quantities, input prices
for labor and raw materials are calculated. The value of fixed tangible asset (total
8The distance function is agnostic with respact to the economic motivation of decision-maker
unlike the cost function which is consistent with cost-minimizing behavior.
See Grosskopf and Hayes (1993) or (1997).43
productive capital) is used for the capital variable.'0 Aproxy for the capital price,
we use the market interest rate plus the average depreciation rate in the
manufacturing industry.The market interest rate was taken from the bank of
Korea and the Korean statistical yearbook where it is calculatedas the weighted
average of the CD, call, and bond yield rate in the manufacturing industry.
Table 1.Descriptive Statistics (Sample Size = 32)
Variable Units Mean Std.Dev.
Outputs:
QF 106/yr [1, 2, 4] 60165.77753 32185.82019
NQF 106/yr [1, 2, 4] 9160.34747 10075.84892
Inputs:
L 102
/workers f 1, 3, 51 299.50509 39.57924
M 106 tons/yr11, 2, 4] 87930.03125 22881.55143
K 106wons/yr 12, 3] 408131.82642 213530.66020
Input Prices:
WL 106wons/yr [1, 51 461.70705 407.10617
WM 106wons/yr 11, 2, 41 3.05720 1.22000
WK 106wons/yr 11, 5] 0.28007 0.044074
Costs (C): 106wons/yr 506300.9003 242225.68212
Sources:
1] Korean Statistical Yearbook: variousyears
121 Fiscal Loan Division, Treasury Department, Ministry of Finance and Economy
[3J Korean Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation
141 Report on the KoreanMonopolyBusiness: various years
151 Bank of Korea
This is based upon the assumption that the monetary value of capital isa monotonic
transformation of capital. in distance function analysis thistype of capital measure is often used,
for example, Coggins and Swinton (1996) and Englishet al. (1993).44
The parameter estimates of the distance function are presented in Table 2.
Our estimated input distance function satisfies the general regularity properties.
The estimated distance function shows that inputs satisfy monotonicity for all
observations and outputs locally satisfy monotonicity. Concavity and convexity
are also locally satisfied. In addition, monotonicity, concavity and convexity are
all satisfied in the mean sense, i.e., regularity conditions are satisfied when
evaluated at mean of x andy, respectively.
Table 2.Coefficient Estimates
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-statistic
/30 78.1215*** 24.0145 -3.25310
/31 10.9312** 4.23526 2.58100
/32 2.26764** .863365 2.62652
/311 .8405U3** .378442 -2.22096
/112 .193931** .072802 -2.66381
/122 .035261** .014079 -2.50443
all .041129*** .013344 3.08231
a21 .028005** .012143 -2.30635
a31 .013213* .718968E-02 -1.83778
a12 .010371*** .189258E-02 -5.47972
a22 .47101 9E02** .171 684E-02 2.74352
71 .371934*** .125387 2.96629
.239034* .123209 1.94007
yll .082926*** .021503 3.85641
712 .l22969*** .016746 -7.34331
.208259*** .016655 12.5046
fiT! .085127** .040606 -2.09640
fiF2 .17444lE-02 .013429 .129898
flF3 1.07854* .588308 1.83329
p .41829* .134683 1.79554
P2 .680595*** .022348 30.4543
P3 .377805" .024845 15.2067
***Significantat the one percent level (two-tailed test).
"Significant at the five percent level (two-tailed test).
'Significant at the ten percent level (two-tailed test).45
3.5.1Allocative Efficiency
For each input, we calculate allocative efficiencyiCqusing equation (9),
The point estimates of observation specific icare provided in Table 3.For 32
observations, the Korean firm overutilized raw materials (tobacco leaves)
compared to labor. The firm also overutilized capital compared to raw materials.
Table 3.Allocative Efficiency
Year K21 K31 K32
1965 0.64420 0.40092 0.62235
1966 0.67329 0.37755 0.56075
1967 0.74043 0.37376 0.50478
1968 0.84364 0.44273 0.52479
1969 0.76615 0.32522 0.42449
1970 0.70263 0.36993 0.52650
1971 0.55689 0.40804 0.73271
1972 0.53260 0.47610 0.89392
1973 0.53831 0.38665 0.71827
1974 0.50074 0.25978 0.51880
1975 0.49262 0.27239 0.55294
1976 0.54912 0.37512 0.68312
1977 0.61247 0.35833 0.58505
1978 0.66774 0.35776 0.53578
1979 0.67139 0.37611 0.56020
1980 0.62560 0.26124 0.41759
1981 0.62985 0.31028 0.49262
1982 0. 66982 0.32489 0.48504
1983 0.72133 0.36722 0.50908
1984 0.76724 0.45538 0.59353
1985 0.68237 0.38267 0.56079
1986 0.70613 0.38787 0.54929
1987 0.64630 0.36757 0.56873
1988 0.61989 0.30464 0.49145
1989 0.60915 0.27925 0.45842
1990 0.64232 0.37820 0.58881
1991 0.57096 0.34166 0.59839
1992 0.58030 0.34795 0.59961
1993 0.59647 0.34024 0.57042
1994 0.68632 0.37136 0.54109
1995 0.80544 0.41439 0.51449
1996 0.97071 0.56665 0.5837546
This seems to be consistent with one of the characteristics of Korean cigarette
industry. The Korean governmentalfirmhas been encouraged to purchase more
than the optimal quantity of tobacco leaves by paying a favorable price in order to
protect local tobacco farmers.11 Although there is no clear explanation for capital
overutilization, one possible hypothesis is that capital overutilization occurs since
the Korean governmental firm has access to loans at sub-market interest rates.
3.5.2 Technical Efficiency
To obtain measures of technical efficiency, the technique of decomposing
error term is used. If we allow for random error as well as technical inefficiency,
we can assume the error of the distance function equation is a composed error:
=U, + V,., Ut0 (16)
The first term u is half normally distributed with variance, oj and captures
technical inefficiency.The second term v, allows for random shocks and it is
white noise with zero mean and variance, o-. However, our estimates are based
on the assumption of a white noise error term. Therefore the residuals from our
estimation obviously have some upward bias. The residuals from the estimation
can be expressed as
1The Korean cigarette company makes a yearly contract with farmers such that the company
agrees to purchase all tobacco leaves that farmers produce.47
(17)
where a is a positive constant.If we treatas a dependent variable and the
constant term as an independent variable, estimates of the biasa, o-, and ocan
be obtained from the stochastic frontier estimation.
Next, based on the conditional distribution ofu given s, the point
estimates ofu1are calculated using the following formula. Expected u is
*q5(e2/a) 2
----1 1-2/a) a
,1I,
*a
; a(o+ oç)and) ; 0is the standard normal where aa
density,1is the cumulative density, and observational subscripts have been
dropped.We specify the estimable distance function as D1(x,y)p so that
ln[D1(x,y).u]in D(x,y) + 1np. Sincemm =in our distance function equation
in (10), we can rewrite the distance functionas 1D(x,y).exp{-u1 + Vt}.Recall
that the input distance function is the reciprocal of the Farrell input-oriented
measure of technical efficiency.The technical efficiency measure for each
observation is
EFF
1 1 ,where=e+E(ue).
D(y,x;fl)exp{}exp{E(u I 3)}
Measures of technical efficiency for each observationare provided in Table 4.48
Table 4.Technical Efficiency
Year EFF
1966 0.97646
1967 0.97690
1968 0.97613
1969 0.97823
1970 0.97747
1971 0.97634
1972 0.96876
1973 0.97330
1974 0.97638
1975 0.97587
1976 0.97587
1977 0.97431
1978 0.97547
1979 0.97713
1980 0.97765
1981 0.97826
1982 0.97444
1983 0.97653
1984 0.97615
1985 0.97697
1986 0.97576
1987 0.97606
1988 0.97586
1989 0.97605
1990 0.97759
1991 0.97676
1992 0.97673
1993 0.97289
1994 0.97702
1995 0.97649
1996 0.9775249
3.5.3 Hypothesis Test and Bootstrapping
To see the impact of competitionon allocative efficiency we compare the
average of ic,, in years from 1977 to 1987 to the average ofA1,in years from 1988
to 1996. Since there was a structural change of production technology in 1977,
the period from 1965 to 1976 is excluded. The majorreason for the different
efficiency level during this periodseems to be the different technology rather than
the market opening in 1988.Table 5 provides the average efficiency of both
allocative and technical efficiency calculated fromour estimation results for both
sub-periods.
Table 5. Average Efficiency Scores before and after 1988
1. Average Aflocative Efficiency
I ,c21 K31 ,c32
1977-1987 0.67575 0.35903 0.53252
1988-1996 0.68563 0.37511 0.54700
2. Average Technical Efficiency
EFF
1977-1987 0.97625
1988-1996 0.9763250
Both efficiencies after 1988are greater than before.However, in order to
undertake a hypothesis test of whether the level of allocativeefficiency after 1988
is statistically different (increased) fromallocative efficiency before 1988, we
need the distribution of theaverage ofKu.SinceKuis a function of the estimated
coefficients in equation (9), it also hasdistributions.Rather than assume a
distribution, a bootstrap basedon the residuals of the system of equations is
performed to constructan empirical distribution. New dependent variables were
created by adding predicted values of the dependentvariables to newly selected
residuals using random draw with replacement.With the new dependent
variables, the system of equationswas estimated 1000times.12ThenKwas
calculated for each observation basedon the coefficient estimates obtained from
the replicated estimation. Then, theaverage of icy that was calculated in such a
way, therefore, can provide a distribution with the replicated number of elements.
Finally, using Fisher's permutationtest,13the hypothesis test was
conducted. The null hypothesis is that theaverage ic, in the first period (before
1988) is not different fromic,, in the second period (after 1988). For allicj, K3j
andK32,the average efficiency level after 1988 is higherthan before 1988 and the
null hypothesis was rejected at the 1%significance level.
12
Results from Hall (1986) suggest 1000 times isappropriate for estimation of confidence
intervals.
'
The bootstrap test statistic for testing equalityof means in two different samples was suggested
by Fisher in 1930s. See Efron and Tibshirani(1993 chapter 15).51
Similarly, the same bootstrapping technique is usedto construct a
distribution for technical efficiency and Fishertest is applied.The average
technical efficiency level after 1988 increased andat the 1% significance level the
null hypothesis that there isno change in technical efficiency afterl 988 is
rejected.
3.6 Conclusion
Since the import of cigarettes from foreign countrieswas allowed in 1988,
the monopoly Korean cigarette market becamean oligopoly among the Korean
firm and foreign firms. In thispaper we empirically examine whether enhanced
competition in the Korean cigarette market dueto the 1988 structural change of
the market has increased been associated with efficiencyof the Korean firm. An
input distance function and its corresponding dualityto the cost function are
employed to set up the estimating equations. The duality between thecost and
distance function allowsus to measure input shadow prices and calculate
allocative efficiency. Sinceno optimization is presumed, i.e., not actual costs but
shadow or behavioral costsare minimized, the duality equations for each input
explicitly include the shadow pricesas parameters to be estimated.In order to
conduct hypothesis tests a bootstrapping techniquewas used.
The average efficiency levels in the period before 1988were compared to
those in the period after 1988. Accordingto Fisher's permutation test, at the 1%
significance level, we find overutilization ofraw materials compared to labor, and52
capital compared to raw materials, decreasedafter 1988.Also, with 1%
significance level, evidencewas found that the technical efficiency improved after
1988.
In summary we find empirical support for the central hypothesis of this
paper that competition promotes efficiency in the Korean cigarette market. Our
findings with respect to allocative efficiency alsoare revealing the behavior of the
Korean firm: the over-use ofraw materials (tobaccO leaves) reflects favorable
treatment of Korea's tobacco growers; theover-use of capital suggests access to
loans at sub-market rates; and finally that thefirm does not overuse labor
indicates that the firm is notan employer of resort, a common characteristic of
state ownership world wide. Even though both efficiencies increased after 1988
market opening, the differences ofaverage efficiencies over two periods seem to
be minimal. We do not know actually how muchcosts are saved by this slight
efficiency gain due to the enhanced competition aftermarket opening. This issue
remains an interesting and important topic for future research.53
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the behavior ofeconomic
agents and corresponding market outcomes inthepresence of market
imperfections.Chapter 2 analyzes the strategic interaction between market
participants under asymmetric information. Chapter 3 empiricallyinvestigates the
relationship between competition and efficiency.
In chapter 2 we presenta dynamic signaling model between a monopolist
manufacturer and a monopolist retailer, where only theretailer is privately
informed about his/her local demand. Unlike previoussignaling games, the signal
receiver (manufacturer) is the firstmover in this model. From this study we find
that (i) the retailer's inventory stock strategicallyaffects the bargaining power to
lower the next period wholesale price.This outcome occurs even under no
demand uncertainty, (ii) strategic interaction andasymmetric information explain
the observation that retail pricemay not adjust to new demand conditions by
showing that both pooling and separating equilibriums exist, (iii)the pooling
equilibrium survives Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion,(iv) our model with the new
game structure generates a smaller set of equiliria thana typical signaling game
produces.
In chapter 3 we investigate whetheror not the increased level of
competition from tradeexposure increases the efficiency of the single cigarette
producer in Korea. An input distance function andcorresponding duality to cost
function were employed to specifyan estimable system of equations.A54
behavioral cost function is included in the input price equations.Bootstrapping is
used to test hypothesis about competition and firm efficiency. Resultsin chapter
3 show that (i) both allocative and technical efficiency haveincreased with the
introduction of foreign competition in 1988, (ii) for the entire observation period,
raw materials have been overutilized compared to labor and capital has been
overutilized compared to raw materialss, (iii) the utility maximizing governmental
company valued tobacco farmers protection more than labor overutilizaton.
Conclusively, we show that, throughan applied theory model and an
empirical analysis, the market outcomemay depart from perfect competition
outcome when there exist frictional factors of market imperfections.The
importance of this research in chapter 2 is thatwe show asymmetric information
and strategic interactions between retailers and wholesalersexplain the observed
staggering-retail price adjustment behavior without traditional explanationssuch
as menu costs.In addition, we find interesting results associated with retailer's
inventory stock and set of equilibria that inventory modeland signaling game
literature have not addressed yet in their literatures.In chapter 3 we provide an
empirical study with the Korean cigarette marketdata.This study confirms
economic theory by supporting the hypothesis thatcompetition promotes market
and firm efficiency. Also, this study analyzes thebureaucrat input choice behavior
which is still an open question.
Our research in this thesis is limited in variousways. Further study on the
procedure of forming prior beliefs and the infinite horizon modelwould generate
rich implicationson topics associated with the signaling game.In addition,55
measuring the profit gain (or the cost saving) fromgreater efficiency due to
enhanced competition remainsan interesting and important topic for future
research.56
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APPENDICES62
Appendix A: The retailer's Profitas a function of r1
A.! If r1
1 1 12r 1 2i 3 We know p1 =O+r1,q1=9--i -----,x=O-----, r2 =O(p1 +q1),
1 1 and p2 =-0+r7.
We ignore the superscript representingeach state, S=L, H for the moment. Using
these solutions, we can obtain followings.
(1)r2= (2)q2=(3)p,=9+-
The profit of the retailer is
(4)
B
rjqi+ bIp2(0-p2) r2q2I
If we substitutep', q, r,P2and q into the profit function in equation (4),we
can obtain
(5)
B
=+ o±19s(9s+8), S=H, L
In our example (0"= 1, 8= 1) the hightype retailer's profit is
(6)fl= 7r12/12r1+1/2
A..2Ifr
1 Since x=0, in the case wherer1308/4, correspondingly,i=0, and
1 1 3
P2
Also, since there is no inventory, the salesequals order quantity in each period,qi
0- p' and q=0- P2. Then profit of the retailer in equation (4)can be rewritten
as63
(7)11B(0)+(p2-r2)(9-p2)]
If we substitutep1, q,r2,P2, and q into the profit function in equation(7),we
can obtain
12 1 (8)
11B=r -8Sr+ ,S = H, L
416
In our example the high type retailer's profit is
(9)flBH=r2/4r1/2 + 5/16
Appendix B: Pooling Equilibrium
B.! Second Period Wholesale Price to PoolingStrategy
We know that r21'0.23, q2"(r2'') = 0.385, q21(r2")0.085
EU2 (r2")=r217[2(q2hI(r2P))+ (1 - 2)(q2L(r2))} = 0.23[0. 1(0.385) + 0.9(0.085)]
= 0.02645
Since q'' += 0.55 = 1, the high type's inventory x' = 0. Corresponding
r20H/2= 1/2 andq2H(r2H)0H 2H9H
In this case optimal q21(r2')= 0 since any positive q2L(r21f) yields only negative
profit in period 2 given r!'1/2
ELI2A(r2hJ)= 0.5(O.1)(0.25) = 0.0125
The condition i. iii is satisfied since EH2A(rTf)= 0.085 > EU2''(r211) = 0.012564
B.2 The Retailer's Profits
B.2.a The High Type's Profit: Pooling
11BH(P)=(p1Pri)qiP + yj2(r2P)(O-p2H(r2P))r2"q2"(r2'')],
where P in parenthesis denotes poolingstrategy.The optimal choices of the
retailer in the second periodas functions of r2' are
p2fr2') =0.615
9H-p2(r2)=10.615=0.385
q(rP)0.385 (since=0 and0H p2H(r2P)q2hJ(r1))
(1)fJBH(p)(0.445 rj)0.105 + [(0.385)21
=(0.445r1)0.l05 + [0.148225]0.194950.105r1
Note that 8= 1 in our example.
B.2.b The High Type's Profit: Deviating
If the retailer deviates from poolingstrategy, the manufacturer will believe it is
the high type and correspondingly,he will charge r2'1 to the retailer.Thus, the
maximum profit of the retailer whendeviating is going to be the same as the
profit under complete information.
(i)r30H14=0.75
(2) Max{fl'(D)}=7r2/l2-r1 + 1/2, where D denotes deviating.
(ii)r43911/4=0.75
Similarly, the maximum profit whendeviating is identical to the profit under
complete information.
(3) Max{IIl"(D)} BH=r2I4rI2 + 5/16 (see appendix A)65
B.2.c The Low Type's Profit: Pooling
The profit of the retailer when poolingis
11BL(P) 1P(0L
-p1'1) -r!q" +6L(rP)(oL pL(rP))
Since p"1+ q1P0L,the first period profit is p1P(9Lp1P)riqi'1.Optimal
solutions as functions of r,'1are
p21(r2'1)(0L+r2')/2=(0.5+0.23)/2=0.365
0L
-p2(r2'1)0.50.3650.135
9LL(P)xL=0.085
Therefore,
(4)JJBL(p)=(0.445)(1/20.445)0.l05r+[0.365(0.135)0.23(0.085)]
=(0.024475)0.105r1+[0.029725]=0.0542 0.l05r
B.2.d The Low Type's Profit:Deviating
(i)r10L0.5
If the retailer deviates from poolingstrategy, the manufacturer will believe it is
the high type and correspondingly,he will charge r2to the retailer. Even if the
low type retailer hasa positive amount of inventory, the manufacturer believes it
is the high type andso, he believes the retailer's inventory is 0 since
1L+q1Lis
always less than 0".Therefore, the manufacturer charges r2F9H/2
Hence any order quantity in secondperiod with paying this wholesale price
cannot yield positive profit.So, the low type retailer's second period order
quantity will be zero and therefore,the only second period sales and retail price
areand(0L-x'), respectively. Thus,the maximum profit of the retailer when
deviating is going to be the following.
Max{fl'' (D)}=p1L(0L 1L- 1L+ XL) +61,x"(O'-x')]
First order conditionsare:
F.O.C)(5)L
- 0
(6) xL: r1 +0L- 066
Using equation (5) and (6),
L_ L L L(0L+)/2andq1L =(eLri)/2sinceqi0 -P1
Thus,
(7) Max{U (D)}((0L+ ri)/2)((OL-ri)12)-ri((OL-ri)/2±(0Lri)/2)
[((0L-ri)/2)((0' + ri)/2)]
=l/4(¼-r12)-ri(l/2-ri)+ 1/4(¼-ri2)
=l/2(¼-ri2)-ri(l/2-ri)
(ii) r1>=0.5
if ri>9L=0.5, then xL=0 and
q1L=0, since xL(0Lri)/2 and
q1L
(0Lri)/2. Therefore, is also zero and the profit is
(8) Max{fl(D)}p1L(9L .1Lri(9' -pi' + XL) + ]x'(9"-x")]0
B.3 Range of r1 for Existence ofPooling Equilibrium
B.3.a The Range for High Type
(i) r130"/4=0.75
To satisfy the condition forexistence of pooling equilibrium, the profit in
equation (1) must be greateror equal to the maximum profit when deviating in
equation (2). Therefore, thefollowing must be satisfied.
0.194950.105r17r12/12-r1+ 1/2
7r12/12-0.895r1 + 0.305050
r12 l.53428r1+0.522940
0.51109r11.023 19767
In this case, sincerl must be greater than 0.75, the range r1 for is the following.
Result 1: 0.51109r10.75
(ii) Ti39H140.75
For existence of pooling equilibrium, also the profit inequation (1) must be no
less than the profit in equation (3)as the following.
0.194950.lO5rj0.3125-0.Srj + 0.25r12, multiply both terms by 4,
0.77980.42r1ri2-2r+1.25
1 .58r1+0.47020
O.3977rj1.1823
In this case, since r1 must be lessor equal to 0.75 the range for r1 is the following.
Result 2: 0.75<r11.1823
B.3.b The Range for Low Type
(i)r =0.5
To satisfy the condition for existence ofpooling equilibrium, the profit in
equation (4) must be greateror equal to the maximum profit when deviating in
equation (7). Therefore, the followingmust be satisfied.
0.05420.105r1rI2- rI2 +118
r2/2_0.395rj+0.07080, multiply both terms by 2,
r-0.79rj+0.14160
0.2749 r10.5151
In this case, sinceri must be less than 0.5, the range Ti for is the following.
Result 3: 0.2749r10.568
(ii) r1>0L=0.5
To satisfy the condition for existence ofpooling equilibrium, the profit in
equation (4) must be greateror equal to the maximum profit when deviating in
equation (8). Therefore, the followingmust be satisfied.
0.05420.105r10
Result 4: r10.5162
Combining Result 1-4: pooling equilibrium exists when the manufacturer
charges the first period wholesale priceto the retailer in the following range,
Result 5: 0.51109r10.5162
B.4 Expected Profit of the Manufacturer in Pooling Equilibrium
= + rf [)l(q211(r2")) + (1 (q2(r212))]
JJA(J,)=0.5162(0.105) + 0.23[0.1(0.385) + 0.9(0.085)] =0.05420+ 0.02645
=0.08065
AppendixC:Separating Equilibrium
C.1If r1>380"14
Since r1 is greater than 3ö0 H /4, optimal q"is(OH+ r1)/2.The high type
retailer's profit from revealing his type is then
1i"(R)p(off
1)jq +5[(- )2]
1r12 1 1 2 =(-----)+(1---2r1 +r )+-
22 164 16
0.3 125-0.5r1 + 0.25ri269
Profit from mimicking the low type is
UBH(M)=(ii-i)q11
_jqL+j(r)(O"
Note that R and M denotes revealing and mimicking,respectively. Since ri>
optimalqiLis 0.If the high type mimics the low type by choosing qi'=0, the
hih type can face the whole sale price inthe second period r21=oLa'/.Then
P2 as a function of r21 is
H(L) (OH+ r25/2.
(OH+ rh(9HrJ) (OH
Note thatq2H UBH(M)_[ -r2
2
=[(O'r)2 /4](1_O.25)2/4]0.140625
If the profit from revealing isgreater than the profit from mimicking, then
separating equilibrium is identical to the solutionunder complete information (no
envy case):
if 0.3125-0.5r + 0.25rj2 <0.140625
0.441 <r1 <1.559
Therefore, for r1 > 0.75, separating equilibriumis that each type chooses the
complete information solution fully revealing histype.
C.2IfOL<r<30H/4=O75
C.2.a Envy Case
The retailer's profits when revealing andmimicking are, respectively,
HBH(R)7r12!12-r + 1/2
flBH(M= (P1 -r1)q1' + 6[p2'(r21)( 0H _P2H(,,.2L))-r2'q211(r21)]
=0 + [0.140625],
where R and M in parentheses denoterevealing and mimicking, respectively.
Since r0L,optimal q'=0 and the manufacturer will charge r2L baseon belief
thatq1L=0 and=0, so, r219L121!4. Then q211(r2')- 3/8 andfl2BH(
[q2"(r21)]2. Note that P2H(r2L)-r2q2H(r2L)in this case where x=0.70
For IIIBH(R)FJBH(M)
7r2Il2-r1 + V20.140625
r12 12r1/7+ 0.616070
0.5127r11.1795
Therefore, for 0.5127 r10.75 it is envy case (there is an incentive for
mimicking). To prevent mimicking the Ltype must choose qi' and pi' such that
(*) flBH(1L q1L 9H r2L) <flBH1H q1H 0H r2H)
Ifqi'>0, then q1L(since r1>0L)and r2' -x'
q1L
p211(r21)(9H+r21)/20.5 + (1/4-qiL)/2=5/8-qiL/2
p11 (r2')r2(9"-r2')/23/8 +qi'12
q211(r21) -p2H(r2L)=1(5/8-qiL/2) 3/8-qi'/2
flBH(JL q1L1 9Hr2)= -rj
q1L+6[(518 -qiL/2)(3/8 +qi'12)
(1/4
q1L)(3/8-qiLI2)]
-r1 q1 +[0.140625 + 0.625qiL_3(q1L)2/4]
11BH,1H q1H 9H
r211)=7ri2/12-ri + 1/2
To satisfy (*) the followingmust be true.
4[flBH(1L q1L9", r2)BH1Hq1H 9Hr2")]
3(q1L)2+ (2.54r1)
q1L+ 0.5625(7ri2/3- 4r1 +2)0
However, this is always positive giventhe range of r1. Thus, there is no way to
make the high type not to mimic thelow type even though the high type retailer
has an incentive to mimic thelow type.Therefore, there is no separating
equilibrium in thiscase.71
C.2.b No Envy Case
If 0.5r1 < 0.5127, then in separating equilibrium the each type reveals it's type
by choosing the solution under complete information.
C.31f39L/4
r1
UBH(R)7r12/12-r1 + 1/2
For this range ofri, the low type retailer chooses (9L-ri)/2 and xL=0 and
correspondingly, r210L12Therefore,
LH L flBH(f)
(P1ri)qi' + 51j72"(r2')( 0H -p211(r2'))-r2 q(r2)]
(9L2
-ri2)/4 + b1(OL/2-r2L/2)2}(1/4-ri2)/4 + 0.140625
For JJBH (R)11BH(iVI) the following must be satisfied.
7r2/l2-r + V2(1/4-r12)/4 + 0.140625
This can be rewritten as r12- 1 .2r1+ 0.3 56250
0.539r0.661
The range of r1 satisfying the conditionfor envy case exceeds 0
L0.5.
Therefore, within therange, 30'14ri <0L,it is always no envy case.
C.4Ifr1<30'I4
For this range of r1 optimal solutions forthe low type are followings.
q1L
-r1/22ri1380L
- 7r116(since 8= 1 in this example)
(0L+ r1)/2
+pi30L722r1/35
In this case r2' (q1L+p')=2 r1/3872
HBH(R)7r12/12-r1 + 1/2
(pi- + OTp211(r21)(0H-p2(r2))-r2Lq2H(r2L)l
The low type retailer has positive inventorystock in this case.However, the
maximumq1L+p1'30L12=(when r1=0). This is less than O"=1, so, the
high type will not haveany inventory when he mimics the low type. Therefore,
p2(r2)=q2H(r2L)and the second period profit for the high type is
fJBII(!TJ) 0HH(L))]2(O"/2-r2112)2='/-r1/3 + r2/9
Then the total profit for the hightype is
JJBH( (0L/2 ri/2)(,9L7ri/6) + '/-r/3 + ri2/9=3/8-7r1/8 + 25r12/36
For J-JBH(R) <flBH(the following must be satisfied.
7r12/12-ri +1/23/87ri18 + 25ri2/36
This can be rewrittenas
A=ri219+r118l/80
Since aA/8r1=2r1/9 + 1/8 > 0, minimum of A is obtained whenr=3/4=
0.375.
Ari=0375=(0.375)2/9+ (0.375)/81/8=-0.0625 <0.
Thus, the condition that mimicking profit isgreater than revealing never be
satisfied.Therefore, for this range ofrj, it is no envy case and separating
equilibrium is identical to the solution undercomplete information.73
Appendix D: Profits of the Manufacturer in Separating
Equilibrium
The manufacturer's profit in separating equilibriumis
fJA(5)r1[%(qi') + (12)(qiL)] + +(12)( r2Lq2L)]
11.1 Ifr1<3O'14
Under this range ofri, the equilibrium is no envy case where the retailer reveals
his type by choosing complete informationsolution.
q1L
- 7r116 = 1/27ri/6 (since 8= 1 in our example)
q1H= 9H7r/61 -7r116
Note that rj= 39S12(q1S+pjS) (30S/22r1/36) = 2r1/38= 2r/3
Note that
q2S29S_2S(q1S+piS) (S+r2S)/2(q1S+piS)
(30S/2(qlS+p1S))/2riS/2= r1/38= r113
The manufacturer's profit is
ri[2(qiH)+ (1 + [2(r2Hq2TJ) + (1- A)(r2Lq2L)l
ri[0.1(1 - 7r116) + 0.9(1/2- 7r116)] +[0.1(2r12/9) + 0.9(2r12!9))
r1[O.1 + (0.9)127r1/6)] + 2ri2/9]
=0.55r17ri2/6 + 2r2/90.55r1-17r12/18
0.55 34r1/180 ;r1= 0.55(9/17)0.29118
flA(5)is maximized whenr1= 0.29118 sincea2uA(5)/ar 2- 17/9 <0.
flA(S)ri=O.29ii80.55(0.29118)17(0.29118)2/18= 0.0800774
D.2 If30L14<<0L
Equilibrium is also noenvy case. The each type retailers' solutions are
q1L0L12- r1/2 =1/4-r1/2 and q'=0L141/8 (sincex'0 and r2L=0/2=1/4)
q1H
-7r1/6 1- 7r1/6(since 51 in our example)
r2= 2r113andq2H=r1/3
Then the manufacturer's profit is
rj{2(qiU)+ (1-2)(qiL)l+ [2(r2"q2'1) + (1- 2)(r2Lq2L)]
=ri[0.1(1-7r1/6)+0.9(1/4- ri/2)) +[0.1(2r1219)+0.9(l)4)(l/8)]
[0.lri+0.9 r1/40.56666r12]+[0.2r12/9+0.028125]
anA(s)/a0.3251.13333r1 + 0.4r1/90 ; r0.325/(1.08888)0.29847
flA(gis maximized whenr10.29847 since ô1T4(S)/8ri2 -1.13333 < 0.
However, this is not in therange of r1, the corner solution is that r130L/4
0.375
=0.325(0.375)-0.5444(0.375)2+ 0.028125=0.07344
D.3 If0L
r1
D.3.a If 0.5r1<0.5127
In this range ofr1, the separating equilibrium is identical to the solution in
complete informationcase (no envy case).
Each type 's solutionsare
q1L=0, q2'=O'/4=1/8 (since x1= 0, r2L=0h721/4)
q1H=
17r1/6,q r1/375
flA(g)ri[(qi") + (1,%)(q1L)1+ [2(r2Hq2H) + (1- 2)(r2Lq2
ri[0.1(17ri16)+0.9(0)1+[0.1(2ri219)+0.9(1/4)(l/8)]
0.1r1 -0.1(7)ri216 +0.1(2r12/9)+0.9(1/4)(l/8)
= 0.10.18889r1 = 0;r=0.1/(0.18889)=0.5294
flA(is maximized whenr1= 0.5294since ?J2JJ'1(S)15ri2= -0.18889 < 0.
However, this is not in therange of ri, the corner solution is that r10.5127
flA(g)=0.1(0.5127)-0.1(7)(0.5127)2/6+0.1(2(0.5127)2/9)+0.9(114)(1/8)
=0.05438
D.3.b If 0.5127rj <0.75
In this range of r, there isno separating equilibrium.
D.4 1f30"14r1
In this range ofrl, the separating equilibrium is in no envy case.
q1L:=0,q2I9L/41/8 (since0, r219'/2=1/4)
qjL[=(OHrj)/2 =(1 -ri)/2, =1/4(sincex"= 0, r21'=O"/21/2)
11A(5D)=ri[(qi11) + (1-2)(qiL)] + [(r2'q2')+ (1,)(r2Lq25]
ri[0.1(l/2ri/2) + 0.9(0)] +[0.1(1/2)(1/4)+0.9(1/4)(1/8)]
=0.05r0.05r12+ 0.1(1/8) +0.9(1/32)
ariA(s)/a0.050.1r10 ; r1=0.051(0.1)=0.5
flA(s)is maximized whenr1=0.5 sincefl'(S)/ar12= -0.1 <0. However, this is
not in the range of r1, thecorner solution is that ri=0.75
ffA()=0.05(0.75)-0.05(0.75)2±0.1/8+0.9(114)(118)0